How initial conditions can have permanent effects: the case of the affordable care act by Scheuer, Florian & Smetters, Kent
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
How initial conditions can have permanent effects: the case of the affordable
care act
Scheuer, Florian; Smetters, Kent
Abstract: We document that states that experienced website glitches in the ACA’s first year faced
higher average costs that persisted into future years. These dynamics are inconsistent with the standard
strategic-pricing model, which requires non-localized common knowledge about market conditions, but
are consistent with price-taking. Initial conditions can have a permanent effect - including convergence
to a Pareto-dominated, stable equilibrium - under conditions that we show are plausible in this setting.
Changing the fine from a fixed amount to a fraction of equilibrium prices increases the likelihood of
reaching a Pareto-efficient equilibrium without increasing the equilibrium fine collected.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140204
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-168647
Journal Article
Published Version
 
 
The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution-NoDerivs-NonCommercial 1.0
Generic (CC BY-ND-NC 1.0) License.
Originally published at:
Scheuer, Florian; Smetters, Kent (2018). How initial conditions can have permanent effects: the case of
the affordable care act. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10(4):302-343.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140204
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2018, 10(4): 302–343 
https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140204
302
How Initial Conditions Can Have Permanent Effects:  
The Case of the Affordable Care Act†
By Florian Scheuer and Kent Smetters*
We document that states that experienced website glitches in the ACA’s 
first year faced higher average costs that persisted into future years. 
These dynamics are inconsistent with the standard strategic-pricing 
model, which requires non-localized common knowledge about 
market conditions, but are consistent with price-taking. Initial con-
ditions can have a permanent effect—including convergence to a 
Pareto-dominated, stable equilibrium—under conditions that we 
show are plausible in this setting. Changing the fine from a fixed 
amount to a fraction of equilibrium prices increases the likelihood of 
reaching a Pareto-efficient equilibrium without increasing the equi-
librium fine collected. (JEL H51, H75, I13, I18)
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) limits the degree to which insurers can price discriminate based on age and preexisting conditions, while 
fining people who do not obtain health coverage. Enrolling healthier people is, there-
fore, widely regarded as important for avoiding high premiums. However, several of 
the ACA’s “initial conditions” might not have been sufficient to encourage healthy 
individuals to enroll. The initial condition that received the lion’s share of atten-
tion—and the one that is most plausibly exogenous—was the failure of the websites 
that managed the enrollment process.1 As Economist (November 23, 2013) put it:
Insurers have set their premiums on the assumption that lots of young, 
healthy people would be compelled to buy their policies. But if it takes doz-
ens of attempts to sign up, the people who do so will be  disproportionately 
1 There were several other initial conditions that likely played a role in reducing enrollment by healthier house-
holds. First, the ACA fine (the “shared responsibility penalty”) was quite small in 2014, equal to the greater of $95 
or 1 percent of income, growing modestly in the following years. Moreover, these fines can only be levied against 
positive tax refunds. Second, around half of noncompliant households are exempted from paying the fine, including 
due to financial hardship (Pauly 2017). Third, because some households on the individual health insurance market 
lost their coverage, the government announced on November 14, 2013 that it was allowing individual state insur-
ance commissioners to extend canceled policies by one year, a move widely denounced by insurers as potentially 
creating adverse selection. Fourth, many young shoppers with new employers also have to separately submit payroll 
stubs, reconfirm their health exchange status at a later time, and then contact the insurer to make a payment. A
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ticipants at Stanford, Wharton and the NBER Insurance Meeting 2014 for helpful comments.
† Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140204 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
VOL. 10 NO. 4 303SCHEUER AND SMETTERS: PERMANENT EFFECTS OF INITIAL CONDITIONS
the sick and desperate. Insurers could be stuck with a far more expensive 
pool of customers than they were expecting, and could have no choice but 
to raise prices next year. That would make Obamacare even less attractive 
to the young “invincibles” it needs to stay afloat. (2013, 15)
In the United States, insurance is regulated at the state level, where enrollment 
also occurs. The ACA permits individual states to set up their own compliant web-
sites for enrollment, or states could elect to use the federal website. Besides the 
well-documented problems with the federal website, some states that established 
their own websites also suffered from website failures. We, therefore, can distin-
guish between three types of enrollment experiences: “Glitch” states that established 
their own ACA exchanges but suffered severe technological glitches during the 2013 
open enrollment season, immediately before ACA coverage became available in 
2014;  “No Glitch” states that established their own exchanges and had no major 
technological glitches; and “Federal” states that used the federal website, which also 
had numerous glitches. This classification follows the website review by Dash and 
Thomas (2014) and was subsequently used by Kowalski (2014).
Using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, we show 
in Section I that “Glitch” and “Federal” states, indeed, suffered from much larger 
increases in average costs in 2014, the first year of ACA implementation. Remarkably, 
this pattern then persisted into 2015 and 2016, suggesting that poor initial condi-
tions might have permanent effects. In essence, “Glitch” and “Federal” states appear 
to have converged, over time, to a “bad” permanent equilibrium, whereas the “No 
Glitch” states have settled into a better equilibrium. Absent other systematic differ-
ences between these states, this outcome requires the existence of multiple equilibria.
The textbook theory of insurance unraveling, however, is not specified in terms 
of initial conditions but as the equilibrium of a static system of insurance cost and 
demand equations across risk types (Akerlof 1970, Wilson 1977, 1980). The main 
strand of literature has implicitly focused on price-taking with linear demand and cost 
curves (see, e.g., Cutler and Reber 1998; Einav and Finkelstein 2011; and Hackmann, 
Kolstad, and Kowalski 2015). Linear curves produce a unique equilibrium that emits 
a degree of risk sharing ranging from full pooling to no pooling (“unraveling”), or 
something in between. For example, Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015) analyzes 
a model of the ACA health exchanges with a unique equilibrium and concludes that it 
may eventually involve limited degrees of risk pooling.2 But there is no role for initial 
conditions in choosing that outcome. We present simulation evidence (Section IV) 
that demonstrates a strong case for nonlinear curves in the context of health insurance.
Another and more recent strand of literature has considered strategic insurers in 
this setting, potentially with nonlinear cost and demand curves (Einav, Finkelstein, 
potential counterbalancing effect is the fact that, if the initial enrollment deadline is missed, subsequent enrollment 
is delayed until the next open enrollment season. However, this effect was weakened during the initial year of the 
ACA implementation since open enrollment occurred twice in 2014, roughly six months apart, in order to make its 
timing consistent with Medicare’s open enrollment season in the following years. Moreover, as shown in Section I, 
broad exemptions were provided for “exceptional” cases, which, in practice, allowed for considerable enrollment 
outside of open enrollment. 
2 See also Mahoney and Weyl (2017), who consider the interaction between market power and selection in a 
model with a unique equilibrium. 
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and Cullen 2010). In Section II, however, we evoke the well-known result that a 
model of strategic insurers also cannot produce multiple equilibria, even with non-
linear demand and cost curves. A profitable deviation would always exist at a low 
level of coverage. As Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) emphasizes in the 
setting of labor markets with adverse selection, the strategic model assumes that 
firms have common knowledge about all market fundamentals, including the global 
shape of the demand and cost curves. We illustrate that this assumption is very 
strong in our setting. When it fails, insurers will likely resort to less risky, adaptive 
premium setting that effectively turns them into price-takers, and we provide further 
statutory reasons that might compel this type of behavior.
In fact, in the numerous media articles discussing the importance of the initial 
health mix for future prices, we could not find evidence that suggested that an insuf-
ficient mix of younger enrollees might actually lead insurers to reduce premiums, 
in order to improve the risk pool, compatible with strategic pricing. Consistently, 
Cutler and Reber (1998), Monheit et al. (2004), and Clemens (2015) provide evi-
dence of repeated marginal price changes that suggest that insurers do not a priori 
know the entire shape of the demand and cost curves in the market and locally adjust 
premiums in response to profits or losses they experience.
In Sections III and IV, we present a model, which does not constrain the shape 
of the cost and demand curves, to demonstrate that initial conditions only become 
relevant when firms are price-takers and face at least one nonlinear demand or cost 
curve. While receiving less attention in the insurance literature, price-taking with 
nonlinear curves has been a textbook model in the study of adverse selection in 
labor markets, including Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995). However, that 
literature has not emphasized the distinction between stable and unstable equilib-
ria. Only stable equilibria matter for public policy purposes, and with two equilib-
ria, only one of them can be stable. Instead, embedding the nonlinear price-taking 
model within an intertemporal framework leads to the intuitive condition that 
there must be at least three equilibria for the effect of initial conditions to persist 
over time, one of which must be unstable. While satisfying this condition might 
seem like a tall order, using data from the Medical Expenditure Survey, we argue 
that in the context of health insurance there is sufficient nonlinearity to make this 
outcome a genuine possibility, if not the likely outcome, at realistic levels of risk 
aversion.
Our baseline analysis does not consider two key policy features of the ACA: the 
levy of fines on those who do not purchase insurance and subsidies for many house-
holds that do. Fines and subsidies play fairly uninteresting roles from a welfare per-
spective in the textbook models outlined above. While a fine, for example, can force 
a higher insurance take-up rate, it is generally not Pareto improving. However, these 
mechanisms play a more important role in our three-equilibria model, where the 
“bad” equilibrium with lower coverage is Pareto inefficient. Section V shows that 
fines and subsidies expand the likelihood of arriving at the “good” equilibrium with 
relatively higher coverage from a given initial condition. The “good” equilibrium is 
also Pareto efficient.
Our empirical evidence presented in Section I, however, suggests that the exist-
ing fines and subsidies might not have been sufficient in moving the “Glitch” and 
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“Federal” states to the “good” equilibrium. One seemingly obvious fix would be to 
increase the fine value. However, this approach may be both inefficient and polit-
ically challenging. Instead, Section V shows that simply changing the form of the 
fine—from an absolute amount to a relative amount expressed as a percentage of 
market premiums, as previously taken in Massachusetts—can move these states to 
the “good” equilibrium.3 Moreover, this change can be constructed in a way that 
does not cost noninsured consumers anything more in the good equilibrium than the 
current absolute fine. A shift from the current structure, which is absolute for most 
of the population, to a relative one can thereby achieve a Pareto improvement.4
Section VI concludes. Proofs are provided in Appendix A. Model extensions are 
provided in Appendix B.
I. Empirical Patterns
Our model, presented later, adds dynamics to the standard adverse selection 
model, and demonstrates how adverse selection in the first period after a policy 
change can competitively persist into future periods. As empirical motivation, this 
section examines the recent experience of the ACA, which has now been operating 
for several years. The evidence supports the role of initial conditions predicted by 
our model.
A. The Data
We follow the general data strategy in Kowalski (2014), who examined the initial 
impact of the ACA at the state level. We extend her analysis to included the full 2014 
year and years 2015 and 2016.
State-level data comes from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC), as collected by SNL Financial. NAIC collects insurer data on a quarterly 
basis for enrollment, coverage, premiums, and costs. As with Kowalski (2014), we 
dropped Massachusetts due to data issues associated with its cross-over from its 
own individual market exchange system to the ACA. Some health insurers, though, 
operate across multiple states, and NAIC quarterly data is at the firm level, aggre-
gated across states. For multistate insurers, therefore, we allocate the insurer-quarter 
data at the state level using the insurer’s annual filings data, which is disaggregated 
at the state level for regulatory purposes.5 In some rare cases, the annual filing for 
a particular state and year was not captured by NAIC. In those cases, we use the 
multistate insurer’s Schedule T form, which is filed in each state on a quarterly 
3 The ACA’s current penalty is calculated in two different ways—as a percentage of household income or as a 
dollar amount per household member—with the ultimate fine given by the higher of the two. Moreover, the fine is 
capped by the national average premium of a bronze plan sold through the marketplace, which effectively intro-
duces some limited degree of premium dependence for high-income individuals. Our results imply that specifying 
the fine more broadly as a function of market premiums for the entire population would be highly desirable. 
4 Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2015), for example, computes the optimal absolute level of the fine in a 
model calibrated to the Massachusetts health exchanges. Consistent with the previous literature, their model is static 
and assumes linear demand and cost curves, thus excluding the possibility of multiple equilibria and any difference 
between absolute and relative fines. 
5 For 2016, we use the percentages from the 2015 annual filings, since 2016 annual filings are not yet available. 
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basis. Relative to annual filings, Schedule T filings have the advantage of being 
quarterly and distinguishing by state. The disadvantage is that Schedule T filings 
aggregate the insurer’s individual health insurance with its other lines of business, 
and only include information about premiums (not enrollment, coverage, and costs). 
Schedule T filings, therefore, are used only as a last resort.
Following Dash and Thomas (2014) and Kowalski (2014), states are divided into 
three types: “Glitch” states that established their own ACA exchanges but suffered 
severe technological glitches during the 2013 open enrollment season, immediately 
before ACA coverage became available in 2014; “No Glitch” states that estab-
lished their own exchanges and had no major technological glitches; and “Federal” 
states that used the federal exchange and website, which, as well-documented in 
the national press, suffered from moderate-to-severe glitches during the 2013 open 
enrollment season.6
B. Average Costs
Figure 1 shows the weighted average of average costs for individual health plans 
across “Glitch,” “No Glitch,” and “Federal” states on a quarterly basis, between 
March 31, 2014 and June 30, 2016, the last quarter with a stable data release. For 
each of the three years, bold tick marks highlight the quarter ending in March 31, 
as the open season for enrollment and new premium rates are set in the previous 
 quarter. March 31, 2014, therefore, represents the first quarter of data impacted by 
the ACA. March 31, 2015 represents the first quarter of data in the ACA’s second 
6 “No Glitch” states included California, Colorado, Connecticut, Washington, DC, Kentucky, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Washington. “Glitch” states include Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, and 
Oregon. The remainder of the states are “Federal.” 
State–Glitch
State–No glitch
Federal
20
13
-1
2-
31
Relative to 1 at 2013-12-31
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
20
14
-0
3-
31
20
14
-0
6-
30
20
14
-0
9-
30
20
14
-1
2-
31
20
15
-0
3-
31
20
15
-0
6-
30
20
16
-0
3-
31
20
16
-0
6-
30
20
15
-0
9-
30
20
15
-1
2-
31
Figure 1. Average Costs per Member Month
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year. Similarly, March 31, 2016 represents the first quarter of data in the ACA’s third 
year.
Average costs are computed as total costs in a given state divided by “member 
months” of coverage provided in that quarter. Because states might differ in aver-
age costs for reasons other than technology, the ACA cost experience in each state 
is normalized relative to its average cost as of December 31, 2013, one quarter 
before ACA-impacted data shows up in our dataset. The weights for computing the 
weighted average of the average costs within each of the three state categories are 
fixed at the relative number of member months in each state as of December 31, 
2013.7
Figure 2 shows the weighted average of average costs for each of the three state 
categories relative to March 31, 2013, one year before the impact of the ACA. Notice 
that changes in average costs across the three state categories did not vary that much 
before December 31, 2013, suggesting that technological glitches occurring in the 
fall 2013 were fairly randomly distributed. Moreover, the subsequent average cost 
trend lines shown in Figures 1 and 2 are similar, suggesting that the exact compar-
ison date is not a big driver of the analysis. So, in the discussion below, we take 
the quarter ending on December 31, 2013 as our “base quarter” of comparison, as 
shown in Figure 1.
Three basic time trends stand out in Figure 1. First, average costs tend to increase 
in the last quarter of each calendar year and then drop in the first quarter of ACA 
coverage, ending in March 31. This dynamic is consistent with members rushing to 
obtain treatment before their current policy expires.
7 Alternatively, updating weights quarter by quarter, instead of fixing them at their values before the reform, 
would include the effects of adverse selection from the ACA reform and, therefore, artificially decrease the weights 
placed on states experiencing adverse selection after the passage of the ACA. 
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Second, first-year average costs increased substantially more in “Glitch” and 
“Federal” states relative to “No Glitch” states. By March 31, 2014, average costs 
were actually lower in all three types of states, by 20 percent in “No Glitch” states, 
by 6 percent in “Glitch” states, and by 14 percent in “Federal” states. The overall 
reduction is expected since, as just noted, the first quarter tends to have lower costs 
than the last quarter, and our base quarter is the last quarter of 2013. However, the 
differential suggests the potential for adverse selection. More importantly, notice 
that even larger differences begin to emerge during the 2014 calendar year. By 
December 31, 2014, average costs grew by 51 percent relative to the base quarter 
in both “Glitch” and “Federal” states, while remaining unchanged in “No Glitch” 
states. Intuitively, as noted in the quote from The Economist in the introduction, a 
larger hurdle to enroll screens for the sickest members.
Third, Figure 1 shows that the “bad initial condition” in “Glitch” and “Federal” 
states persisted beyond 2014, carrying into 2015 and then 2016. Relative to the base 
quarter, by June 30, 2016, average costs rose 73 percent in “Glitch” states and by 
105 percent in “Federal” states. In contrast, average costs rose by only 10 percent in 
“No Glitch” states.
C. Average Premiums and Coverage
Figure 3 shows the change of average premiums. Average premiums are calcu-
lated symmetrically to average costs, that is, by dividing total premiums collected 
by member months served. For the quarter ending on March 31, 2014, premiums 
collected per member were 19 percent higher in “Glitch” states, 24 percent higher 
in “Federal” states, and 17 percent higher in “No Glitch” states. These premiums, 
which were collected under the ACA, are not directly comparable to premiums col-
lected in the base quarter, prior to the ACA, as many pre-ACA plans offered very 
Figure 3. Average Premiums per Member Month
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basic coverage. However, the similar percent change for all three plans shows that 
insurers in “Glitch” states and “Federal” states had a limited ability to alter their 
premiums in response to website glitches during the first year.
Differences in average premiums begin to emerge in future years. For the quar-
ter ending on March 31, 2015—the first quarter after which premium rates could 
be readjusted by insurers—premiums collected per member rose around 51 per-
cent in both “Glitch” and “Federal” states, but by 36 percent in “No Glitch” states. 
By the quarter ending on March 31, 2016, premiums rose 75 percent in “Glitch” 
states, 73 percent in “Federal” states, and by 52 percent in “No Glitch” states. Rate 
increases are regulated at the state level under the McCarran–Ferguson Act; rate 
increases above 10 percent might also be reviewed by the US Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), if the state does not have an established Effective Rate 
Review Program. Given the limited data, it is unclear if these review programs have 
prevented rates in “Glitch” and “Federal” states from increasing even more.8
Notice, however, that in-between the March 31 tick marks, premiums collected 
per member month are sometimes similar between the three different types of states. 
At first glance, these dynamics are surprising because contract prices are fixed 
during this period and the enrollment period is closed, barring a list of exceptions. 
Figure 4, though, shows that member months increased substantially in “Glitch” 
and “Federal” states, relative to “No Glitch” states, during the closed enrollment 
period. Again, this may seem surprising because an increase in enrollment is at odds 
with rising premiums. In practice, however, many people waited until they became 
sick to enroll. If these exceptional enrollments outpaced the dropped coverage by 
healthier people (in response to rising premiums), it can explain the overall increase 
in member months. Apparently, the federal exchange governing the “Federal” states 
was substantially more generous with allowing people to enroll outside of the 
open-enrollment period. “Glitch” states seemed more tolerant as well, especially in 
2015.9
These sharp increases in enrollments outside of the open-enrollment period are 
consistent with a common complaint made by major ACA insurers, in particular, that 
they were forced to expand coverage to a large number of “exceptional” cases during 
the closed-enrollment period, and these cases were sicker on average (see Diamond 
et al. 2018 for systematic evidence). Aetna claimed it dropped coverage in 11 of 15 
states primarily due to the increase in exceptional cases that lead to losses (Bomey 
2016). UnitedHealth Group completely withdrew from the ACA market for the same 
stated reason (Luhby 2016), and Humana also pulled all of its coverage (Abelson 
2017). More recently, for the 2017 season, the Obama Administration tightened the 
rules for signing up for policies outside of open enrollment. On February 15, 2017, 
8 Premiums were also potentially distorted due to early promises of “risk corridors” during the first three years 
of ACA coverage, designed to share risks ex post across insurer experiences. Congress “defunded” the risk corri-
dors in December 2014. As of November 2017, the issue remains in the court system, with about $12.3 billion in 
unpaid payments (Livingston 2017).
9 The generosity of the federal exchange has been well-documented, including in the newspaper articles refer-
enced later. Incidentally, all of the “Glitch” states lean heavily Democratic, which could explain their generosity 
relative to “No Glitch” states. 
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President Trump signed an executive order requiring those applying outside of open 
enrollment to provide documentation proving their eligibility.
Of course, an increase in member months increases the denominator of aver-
age premiums, helping to reduce their values in-between the March 31 tick marks. 
But why did the numerator (premiums collected) not increase proportionally? One 
likely reason is that people who waited until the closed enrollment period to sign up 
tend to be poorer. Under federal law, health services can typically be obtained for 
a period up to 90 days before premiums are paid.10 In some cases, premiums were 
never paid.11
II. Model with Strategic Insurers
In the next three sections, we now turn to possible theoretical foundations for the 
patterns described in the preceding section. For the sake of expositional simplicity, 
we start by considering a simple insurance model that incorporates many of the key 
features highlighted in Akerlof (1970); Wilson (1977, 1980); Einav, Finkelstein, and 
Levin (2010); and Einav and Finkelstein (2011). Our most parsimonious model 
assumes a continuum of risk types, that risk is the only source of consumer hetero-
geneity, and losses are binary. In Appendix B, we demonstrate that our key results 
extend to a model setting with discrete risk types, richer forms of heterogeneity and 
multiple loss sizes.
10 Insurers must cover medical bills for the first 30 days of unpaid premiums. Over the next 60 days, insurers 
may “pend” payments, although the patient can usually still obtain care (Robin 2014). 
11 The exact amount of unpaid premiums is hotly contested. A report issued by Oversight and Investigations 
(2014) of the US Congress argued that only 67 percent of sign-ups paid premiums by April 15, 2014, two weeks 
after the first quarter of coverage was provided. 
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A. Consumers
A unit measure of consumers have wealth  w > 0 and face a potential loss of size 
0 < l < w in the presence of limited liability. Consumers only differ in the probabil-
ity  π ∈ [0, 1] of the loss occurring, which is distributed throughout the population by 
the continuous cumulative distribution function  H(π) with support  [0, 1] .12 Let the 
random variable  Π be  H -distributed, and denote a realization of  Π by  π . Agents are 
risk-averse with a concave Bernoulli utility function  u(c) over consumption, so the 
expected utility of type  π is given by
  πu(w − l ) + (1 − π ) u(w) 
when there is no insurance.
We assume that individuals can choose from exactly two available insurance con-
tracts that differ exogenously in how much of the loss  l they cover. Following Einav, 
Finkelstein, and Levin (2010), and without loss of generality, we normalize the low 
coverage contract to be no insurance at a zero premium, and the high coverage con-
tract to be full insurance at some endogenous premium  p . Abstracting from moral 
hazard, we take  l and each individual’s risk  π as exogenous and, therefore, indepen-
dent of the insurance choice. The demand for insurance, therefore, is only a function 
of the price  p .
The assumption of fixed coverage levels places our analysis in the spirit of 
Akerlof (1970) rather than Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) who endogenize coverage 
levels as well.13 As discussed in Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin (2010) and Einav and 
Finkelstein (2011), this assumption is a reasonable characterization of many insur-
ance markets. It becomes an even more appropriate assumption for the ACA health 
exchanges, which place regulatory bounds on minimum coverage, despite allowing 
for a range of plans that differ in copayments made by consumers (see Handel and 
Winston 2015 for a model of insurance markets with two fixed (nonzero) coverage 
levels, covering 90 percent and 60 percent of an individual’s cost, respectively). 
This modeling decision is also most natural to analyze one of the main policy inter-
ventions of the ACA, namely the penalty for not having insurance, which affects 
the demand for health insurance on the extensive margin and which we consider in 
Section V.
B. Insurers
Following Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin (2010) in the insurance market and 
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) in a labor market setting, suppose there are 
at least two identical, risk-neutral insurers that maximize their respective expected 
profits by setting premiums in a two-stage Bertrand game. In the first stage, insurers 
12 The full support assumption can be viewed as a limiting case where, as in Hendren (2014), even the most 
extreme risk types, for whom the loss never or always occurs, exist with arbitrarily small but positive density. None 
of our substantive results depend on this assumption. Appendix B relaxes this and other assumptions, as noted 
earlier. 
13 See, e.g., Netzer and Scheuer (2014) for a recent treatment. 
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simultaneously announce their premiums. In the second stage, individuals decide 
whether to purchase insurance and, if so, from which insurer.14 In Section III, we 
demonstrate how the results change when insurers act instead as price-takers, as in 
Akerlof (1970).
We assume throughout that an individual’s risk type  π is private information, so 
insurers cannot offer different premiums to different individuals. Even if insurers 
could observe risk types, the ACA does not permit pricing based on preexisting con-
ditions. One can, therefore, think of our analysis as applying to a set of individuals 
who are otherwise identical in terms of characteristics that insurers are allowed to 
price, such as smoking status.
C. Strategic Equilibrium
To characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria of this game, a graphical 
representation following Einav and Finkelstein (2011) is useful. For any critical 
buyer  π ∈ [0, 1] , the average cost of insuring everyone with risk equal to or greater 
than  π is
(1)  Γ(π ) ≡ E [ Π |  Π ≥ π ] l. 
Our assumptions ensure that  Γ(π) is continuous, increasing in  π , and satisfies 
Γ(0) = E [ Π ] l and  Γ(1) = l . In other words, when  π = 0 is the critical type, 
the average cost of the entire population is just the unconditional expected loss. 
However, with critical type  π = 1 , their losses are certain, and so their expected loss 
is simply  l .
On the demand side, we can define the willingness to pay  Ω(π) for insurance of 
each type  π implicitly by solving
(2)  u(w − Ω) ≡ πu(w − l )  + (1 − π ) u(w). 
Since the right-hand side is decreasing in  π , there is a unique solution  Ω(π) for each 
π , which is also continuous, increasing in  π , and satisfies  Ω(0) = 0 ,  Ω(1) = l .15 
In other words, the lowest risk type  π = 0 never experiences a loss and, therefore, 
has no willingness to pay for insurance. In contrast, the highest risk type  π = 1 
experiences the loss  l for sure and is, therefore, willing to pay a premium up to  l . 
We can also interpret  Ω(π) as an inverse demand curve: with a premium  p = Ω(π) , 
insurance will be demanded by all types higher than  π (so that the inverse function 
Ω −1 ( p) identifies the marginal buyer when the premium is  p ).
For the purpose of this section, we assume that there is common knowledge of the 
distribution  H(π) , consumer wealth  w , the loss amount  l , and the form of utility  u(c) . 
14 As usual, to break a tie (since actual currency denominations are technically a countable set to the penny 
level), if multiple insurers announce exactly the same premium levels, individuals then randomize among them 
with equal probabilities. 
15 As is standard, we are assuming that the loss size  l does not exceed available wealth  w . As discussed more in 
Section IV, in the presence of limited liability, it is possible for actual losses to exceed wealth for some types, and 
so  Ω(π) is only weakly increasing in  π and  Ω(1) < l . 
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In other words, the shapes of  Γ(π) (the average cost curve) and  Ω(π) (the willing-
ness to pay curve) are common knowledge among insurers.
The following proposition, which is easily adapted from Mas-Colell, Whinston, 
and Green (1995) and Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010), shows that there is a 
unique equilibrium in this model.
PROPOSITION 1: With strategic insurers, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome of the above two-stage game involves the critical type
  π 1 ∗ = min {π ∈  [0, 1] | Ω (π) = Γ (π) } .
In other words, when insurers set premiums strategically, only the intersection 
of the average cost and the inverse demand curve with the lowest premium and the 
most people covered is an equilibrium.16 Hence, there cannot exist multiple equi-
libria and, therefore, this model does not allow for any role of the type of “initial 
conditions” discussed in the introduction. This result holds even when there are mul-
tiple intersections of the average cost and inverse demand curves (which, as we will 
show in the next section, would each correspond to an equilibrium in a price-taking 
model).
A simple illustration is provided in Figure 5. Note that, by risk aversion, 
Ω(π) ≥ πl , so the inverse demand curve must always lie above the diagonal line 
p = πl . Obviously, we have  Γ(1) = Ω(1) , so there always exists an intersection 
between these two curves and hence an equilibrium. Here, nobody buys insurance 
except for the very highest risk types with  π = 1 , who are just indifferent between 
buying or not buying when faced with the fair premium  p ∗ = l for this pool. In the 
situation depicted in Figure 5, this outcome is, in fact, the only intersection between 
demand and average costs, corresponding to the case of complete unraveling empha-
sized in Akerlof (1970). Specifically, for any  π < 1 , the average cost curve is above 
the demand curve, so insurers would make losses at any premium  p < l .
The fact that condition  Ω(1) = l = Γ(1) holds in this baseline model is not 
required for an equilibrium to always exist. In Section IV, we consider the role of 
limited liability where the willingness to pay at the very highest risk  (π = 1) is lower 
than the average cost. There always exist a “corner” equilibrium where  p = Γ(1) 
and nobody buys insurance. Conversely, as in the model extension in the Appendix, 
if we had  Ω(1) > Γ(1) , then there would always exist an (interior) equilibrium, due 
to the continuity of  Γ and  Ω and the fact that  Ω(0) < Γ(0) .
More interestingly, when the  Ω(π) and  Γ(π) curves cross multiple times, why 
does only the intersection with the lowest premium correspond to an equilibrium in 
the strategic model? To understand this, consider a setting with three intersections. 
Figure 6 illustrates the mechanics when firms behave strategically. Suppose we are 
in the worst intersection with critical type  π = 1 and premium  p = l .17 If all insurers 
set premium  p = l , only types  π = 1 demand insurance, and the average cost of this 
16 For the remainder of the paper, we confine attention to the generic case where all intersections are proper 
intersections rather than tangency points of the two curves. 
17 The same argument could be made about the intermediate equilibrium with  π 2 ∗ and  p 2 ∗. 
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pool is  Γ(1) = l , and so all insurers make zero profits. Hence, as we will formalize 
below, this outcome is a competitive equilibrium in a price-taking model. But it also 
emits a profitable deviation by any strategic insurer. In particular, suppose that an 
insurer deviates and sets a premium  p 2 ′ <  p 2 ∗. As drawn in Figure 6, this insurer will 
capture the entire market with demand from all types  π ≥  π 2 ′ (and observe  π 2 ′ <  π 2 ∗). 
Moreover, at  π 2 ′ , the average cost curve is below the demand curve, so  Γ(  π 2 ′ ) <  p 2 ′ . 
Hence, offering the premium  p 2 ′ will result in strictly positive profits for the deviat-
ing insurer corresponding to the dashed area in Figure 6. The only intersection from 
where there is no such profitable deviation is the one with marginal buyer  π 1 ∗ and the 
lowest premium  p 1 
∗.
D. Is Strategic Pricing Realistic?
Strategic premium setting in a framework of Bertrand-like competition may 
seem like the more relevant case than price-taking for insurance markets, since 
many insurers are not atomistic and do actively set premiums taking into account 
their competitors’ and customers’ responses to their actions. However, as e.g., 
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) emphasizes in the setting of labor markets 
with adverse selection, the outcome in Proposition 1 relies on the assumption that 
firms have common knowledge about all market fundamentals, including the global 
shape of the demand and cost curves  Ω and  Γ . In contrast, in Sections III to V, we 
relax this assumption and only assume that insurers know the average cost of those 
who buy insurance at the going premium; they may not know anything about the 
preferences or risk distribution underlying this equilibrium or have non-localized 
knowledge away from current conditions.
pi
Ω(pi)
Γ(pi)
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Figure 5. Equilibrium with Complete Unraveling
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The strong information requirements in the strategic model are crucial to obtain 
equilibrium uniqueness. In particular, a mistaken attempt at a profitable deviation 
could lead to substantial losses. For instance, suppose again we start from the inter-
section with  π ∗ = 1 in Figure 6. If an insurer deviates by offering a marginally lower 
premium  p = l − ε , this will lead to losses since  Γ(π) > Ω(π) for  π close to one. 
To make profits, a deviating insurer would have to offer a discretely lower premium 
p <  p 2 ∗ < l , but also not too low, since losses would be incurred again if  p <  p 1 ∗. In 
Figure 6, the demand and cost curves are drawn such that the interval of profitable 
premium deviations  (  p 1 ∗ ,  p 2 ∗ ) is still relatively large. However, this need not be the 
case. Figure 7 depicts market fundamentals where this interval is very small and 
far away from the going premium  p = l . In this case, insurers would actually incur 
losses for a large range of premium cuts in  (  p 2 ∗ , l) , and only make profits if they 
reduce premiums by a very large (and just the right) amount until  p ∈ (  p 1 ∗ ,  p 2 ∗ ) . In 
other words, Proposition 1 requires that insurers have precise knowledge about mar-
ket conditions potentially far away from the current situation.
Strategic insurers could potentially limit their losses if they could rapidly change 
prices to try to discover the global shapes of the willingness to pay and average cost 
curves. However, transitory losses from pricing experimentation are magnified by 
the fact that regulations prevent insurers from changing prices frequently. Once set, 
ACA plan premiums are generally locked until the next open enrollment period 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2013).
Even then, sharply increasing premiums after a pricing mistake is challenging. 
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, individual states typically regulate the 
business of insurance, and most states already require some steps before rates can 
Figure 6. Equilibrium Uniqueness with Strategic Insurers
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be increased (National Conference of State Legislatures 2013).18 However, because 
rules vary between states, Title I (Subtitle A, Sec. 1003) of the ACA creates a more 
uniform standard around rate increases. These rules include requiring states to col-
lect premium information and determine if plans should be excluded from the health 
exchange based on unjustified premium increases.19 If an insurer requests a pre-
mium increase above 10 percent, a more detailed explanation must be provided 
and posted on their and the HHS website. The ACA also makes $250 million avail-
able to states to take action against insurers requesting unreasonable rate increases. 
According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2010), “[t]his fund-
ing will help assure consumers in every state that any premium increases requested 
by their insurance company, regardless of size, is justified.”
In the absence of perfect information about the market structure, insurers, there-
fore, may simply prefer local adjustments to premiums in a backward-looking man-
ner, as documented in Cutler and Reber (1998). Such behavior would effectively 
make them price-takers. Consumer-protection laws intended to protect consumers 
from frequent and large price increases could undermine experimentation and essen-
tially force insurers into price-taking behavior. We demonstrate in the following 
sections that equilibrium multiplicity can arise naturally with price-taking insurers, 
including the potential of getting stuck in a bad equilibrium with low coverage and 
high prices.20
18 At least two dozen states require that the insurer receives prior approval from the state insurance commissioner 
or department before increasing health insurance premiums (National Conference of State Legislatures 2013). 
19 For a few states—Alabama, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming—these determinations 
will be made by the federal government since these states do not have review processes in place. 
20 See also Rothschild (1974) for the classic model on experimentation to learn about demand conditions. These 
two-armed bandit models also have the typical feature that multiple equilibria can arise. 
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Figure 7.  Small and Distant Interval of Profitable Premium Deviations
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III. Model with Price-Taking Insurers
We now turn to the notion of competitive equilibrium where insurers act as 
price-takers, as originally proposed by Akerlof (1970). In particular, we ask under 
what conditions multiple equilibria are possible, and how this potential for mul-
tiplicity shapes the role of initial conditions in a dynamic framework. Of course, 
each consumer’s risk level  π is still private information. But we can now relax the 
assumption of common knowledge of the global average cost and demand curves. 
Instead, we only require that insurers know the average cost of those who buy insur-
ance at the current premium. We assume that there are many identical insurers that 
take the market premium as given and decide whether to offer insurance at that 
premium or not.
A. Competitive Equilibria
The following definition of a competitive equilibrium is consistent with the infor-
mational assumptions outlined above.
DEFINITION 1: With unobservable risk types  π , a competitive equilibrium is a 
premium  p ∗ and a critical type  π ∗ such that
(3)  u(w −  p ∗ ) ≥ πu(w − l ) + (1 − π) u(w) ∀ π ≥  π ∗ , 
(4)  u(w −  p ∗ ) < πu(w − l ) + (1 − π) u(w) ∀ π <  π ∗ ,
and
(5)  (1 − H( π ∗ ))  p ∗ =  ∫ 
 π ∗  
1 π dH(π) l. 
The first two conditions characterize consumers’ demand for insurance, given the 
equilibrium premium  p ∗ . At that premium, individuals of risk type  π ≥  π ∗ are just 
indifferent or strictly prefer to buy insurance, whereas all other types  π <  π ∗ prefer 
to stay uninsured. The third condition then requires insurers to make zero profits at 
the policy premium  p ∗ on the pool of risk types who demand insurance when the 
premium is  p ∗ , which includes all types  π ≥  π ∗ . In particular, the left-hand side of 
equation (5) equals the total premium revenue collected from these agents, while the 
right-hand side is equal to their expected losses. This zero profit condition can be 
simply rewritten as  p ∗ = E[ Π | Π ≥  π ∗ ] l , i.e., the equilibrium premium must equal 
the expected loss of the pool of insurance buyers induced to buy the policy.
In terms of the graphical representation introduced in Section II, a competitive 
equilibrium, therefore, is simply any  π ∗ such that  Γ( π ∗ ) = Ω( π ∗ ) , so that the aver-
age cost and willingness-to-pay curves intersect. Hence, the strategic equilibrium 
from Proposition 1 is also a competitive equilibrium, but there may now exist addi-
tional competitive equilibria.
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B. Equilibrium Multiplicity
Since most of the insurance literature has implicitly focused on either linear 
demand or cost curves (see, e.g., Cutler and Reber 1998, and Einav and Finkelstein 
2011) or strategic insurers (Section II and Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen 2010), 
the possibility of multiple competitive equilibria has not received much attention 
in this context.21 As a result, there is no real role for the type of “initial conditions” 
discussed in the introduction, including a website failure.
Equilibrium multiplicity, however, can arise naturally in the price-setting 
framework because the average cost and demand curves are upward sloping, but 
their shapes are otherwise largely unrestricted. A simple example is depicted in 
Figure 8. There are three competitive equilibria in total, namely the one with unrav-
eling located at  π ∗ = 1 as well as two additional equilibria with critical buyers  π 1 ∗
and  π 2 ∗.
As is well-known in other contexts (see e.g. Wilson 1980 for a lemons goods 
market and Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995 for a labor market model with 
unobservable productivities), whenever there are multiple equilibria, they are Pareto 
ranked: the equilibrium at  π 1 ∗ is Pareto better than the equilibrium at  π 2 ∗, which is 
Pareto better than the equilibrium with complete unraveling at  π ∗ = 1 . For exam-
ple, compare  π 1 ∗ against  π 2 ∗. In the equilibrium at  π 1 ∗, all types  π ≥  π 2 ∗ are better off 
than in the equilibrium at  π 2 ∗ because they pay a lower premium for their insurance (i.e.,  Γ(  π 1 ∗ ) < Γ(  π 2 ∗ ) ). Moreover, the types  π ∈ [ π 1 ∗,  π 2 ∗ ) prefer to buy insurance at π 1 ∗ rather than staying with their endowment, which would be their choice at  π 2 ∗. So, 
21 See also Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2015); Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2015); and Mahoney and 
Weyl (2017) for recent studies of health exchanges in models with a unique equilibrium. 
Figure 8.  Multiple Competitive Equilibria
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they are also better off. The types  π <  π 1 ∗ are indifferent because they do not buy 
insurance in either case. Moreover, insurers earn zero profits in all equilibria.
Indeed, the “good” equilibrium  π 1 ∗ —which offers the lowest premium and entices 
the most consumers to buy insurance—Pareto dominates all the others.22 The other 
equilibria arise because of a coordination failure: when only a few individuals pur-
chase insurance, they will be the highest risk types, and so the premium that breaks 
even for this pool will also be high. At the same time, only the riskiest types find it 
worthwhile to sign up for insurance because the premium is so high.
In the next section, we will investigate the nature and policy relevance of equilib-
rium multiplicity in more detail, both in terms of the conditions on primitives that 
are given rise to it, and in terms of their empirical plausibility.
IV. Equilibrium Multiplicity and Initial Conditions
The previous literature examining multiple equilibria has not explicitly distin-
guished between stable and unstable equilibria. For policy purposes, only stable 
equilibria are material. Moreover, initial conditions do not matter with multiple 
equilibria unless at least two are stable. Generating two stable equilibria requires 
having at least three equilibria in total. In this section, we provide sufficient condi-
tions on fundamentals under which multiple stable equilibria exist, and explore their 
relevance quantitatively.
A. Introducing Dynamics
To study the circumstances under which initial conditions could affect which 
competitive equilibrium is reached, a dynamic version of this static model is 
required. The most straightforward way to introduce dynamics is to assume that, in 
each period, premiums reflect the average cost of the pool of individuals who pur-
chase insurance, thereby allowing insurers to always break even. Then, given this 
premium, consumers decide whether to enroll for insurance the next period. Cutler 
and Reber (1998), Monheit et al. (2004), and Clemens (2015) provide evidence for 
this pattern of price and demand adjustments.
These dynamics can be conveniently illustrated graphically using the same type of 
diagram as before. Recall that, for any critical type  π t in period  t , we can read the pre-
mium from the average cost curve by setting  p t = Γ( π t ) . The consumers’ reaction 
in  t + 1 , therefore, can then be read off the demand curve to obtain a new marginal 
buyer  π t+1 =  Ω −1 (  p t ) , and so forth. This leads to the recursion  π t+1 =  Ω −1 (Γ(  π t )) 
for the evolution of marginal buyers, as illustrated in Figure 9. It immediately 
implies that  π increases (i.e., there is unraveling where the premium increases and 
fewer consumers sign up for insurance) whenever  Γ(π ) > Ω(π) while  π falls oth-
erwise (more consumers demand insurance, so the premium falls).
We can see that, of the three competitive equilibria here, only two are sta-
ble, whereas the intermediate one with the marginal buyer  π 2 ∗ is unstable. Which 
22 In fact, the good equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient under the restriction to full insurance contracts. 
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 competitive equilibrium is eventually reached depends on the initial value of  π , as 
formalized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: 
 (i) Initial conditions  π ∈ [0, 1) matter for which competitive equilibrium is 
reached only if there exist at least three competitive equilibria.
 (ii) When there are exactly three equilibria with critical types  π 1 ∗ <  π 2 ∗ < 1 , the 
intermediate equilibrium with marginal buyer  π 2 ∗ is generically unstable 
while the other two are stable. 
 (iii) In this case,  π 2 ∗ is the critical threshold for initial conditions: for any initial π >  π 2 ∗, there is unraveling to the “bad” stable equilibrium where  π ∗ = 1 . For 
any  π <  π 2 ∗, the “good” stable equilibrium with critical type  π 1 ∗ is reached.
PROOF: See Appendix.
While the possibility of equilibrium multiplicity per se is not surprising in this 
model, Proposition 2 formalizes the less immediate result that at least three competi-
tive equilibria are required to obtain at least two stable equilibria, which are the only 
type of equilibria that are relevant for policy purposes. Figure 10 illustrates why the 
existence of just two equilibria is not enough for initial conditions to matter. In this 
case, the best equilibrium is always the (unique) globally stable equilibrium and so 
convergence to the bad equilibrium, which is unstable, cannot occur. As discussed 
earlier, Proposition 2 (i) does not depend on the fact that the condition  Ω(1) = Γ(1) 
implies that  π = 1 is always an equilibrium. In particular, we would have a “corner” 
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Figure 9.  Dynamics and Equilibrium Stability
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equilibrium at  π = 1 if  Ω(1) < Γ(1) , or an interior equilibrium when  Ω(1) > Γ(1) . 
Instead, at least one intermediate, unstable equilibrium is always required in order to 
produce two stable equilibria and, hence, for initial conditions to matter.
With exactly three equilibria as depicted in Figure 9, unraveling occurs starting 
from initial conditions to the left of  π 1 ∗ (a partial unraveling) and to the right of  π 2 ∗ (a 
full unraveling), whereas the dynamics imply falling premiums and more individu-
als enrolling otherwise. Evidence for such dynamics have been documented in states 
which, before the ACA, placed restrictions on adjusting premiums based on age and 
preexisting conditions. Writing about the New Jersey Individual Health Coverage 
Program (IHCP) that began in 1993, Monheit et al. (2004) found dynamics similar 
to those shown in Figure 9 for values of  π >  π 2 ∗ (or  π <  π 1 ∗ ). In particular, between 
the end of 1995 and the end of 2001, enrollment fell from 186,130 individuals to just 
84,968, with premiums rising by 200 percent to 300 percent. Three other states—
Kentucky, New York, and Vermont—tried health care reforms with similar conse-
quences (Cohn 2012). Clemens (2015) provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
effect of the introduction of community rating regulations in these states and finds 
that the fraction of uninsured gradually increased by around 70 percent, from 18 
percent to 31 percent, in the three years following the reforms. Cutler and Reber 
(1998) provides evidence for gradual unraveling of high coverage plans in a setting 
with employer-provided insurance.
As widely reported in the popular media reports, the initial conditions described 
in the introduction would quite reasonably discourage lower-risk consumers from 
enrolling in the health exchanges relative to higher-risk consumers. In the context of 
our model in this section, we would expect consumers with large values of  π to be 
the first to enroll, potentially trapping the system in the bad stable equilibrium. Of 
course, by Proposition 2, these mechanics only matter if multiple equilibria actually 
exist in the first place, a topic to which we now turn.
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Figure 10.  Globally Stable Equilibrium with Two Equilibria
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B. Sufficient Conditions for Multiple Stable Equilibria
We now provide sufficient conditions under which multiple stable equilibria must 
exist. In particular, if risk aversion is not too high, then the bad equilibrium at  π ∗ = 1 
exists and is stable. Moreover, if the distribution of risk types is sufficiently con-
centrated, then there must exist at least one other stable equilibrium with  π ∗ < 1 . 
The following proposition formalizes these conditions.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that
 1.  (6)   u(w )  − u(w − l)  _____________
l
 >   u ′ (w − l) _
2
 ,  
which holds whenever  u is not too concave or  l is sufficiently small, and
 2.   H(π) is sufficiently concentrated, i.e., there exists some interval  [a, a + Δ] 
with  0 < a < a + Δ < 1 such that  ∫ 
a
 
a+Δ
 dH(π) ≥ 1 − ε and both  Δ and  ε 
are sufficiently small. 
Then there exist at least three competitive equilibria, including a stable one at 
π ∗ = 1 , another stable one at some  π ∗ < 1 , and an unstable one in between.
PROOF: See Appendix.
Intuitively, the inequality in (6) puts an upper bound on the willingness to pay 
for insurance, ensuring that the inverse demand curve is steeper (and, hence, located 
below) the average cost curve to the left of  π = 1 . As a result, the worst equilib-
rium is locally stable. Condition 2., in turn, implies that the average cost curve is 
S-shaped and, in particular, must be located below the inverse demand curve for 
some interior  π . Because  Ω(0) = 0 < Γ(0) and by continuity of the  Ω(π) and 
Γ(π) curves, there must exist another stable equilibrium with  0 < π < 1 .
While we have abstracted from limited liability concerns so far by assuming 
l < w , this issue will emerge in some of our calibrations below, as well as in the 
heterogeneous loss-levels extension in Appendix B. The following corollary of 
Proposition 3 shows that limited liability can also ensure equilibrium multiplicity.
COROLLARY 1: Suppose individuals are liable only for losses up to  L < l , where 
L is not too small. Then, condition 2 in Proposition 3 alone is sufficient for the 
existence of at least three competitive equilibria, including a stable one at  π ∗ = 1 , 
another stable one at some  π ∗ < 1, and an unstable one in between.
PROOF: See Appendix.
The intuition is that, similar to bounded risk aversion, binding limited liability 
constraints reduce the willingness to pay for insurance for high risk types, thus 
ensuring the existence of a stable bad equilibrium where nobody buys insurance. It 
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is also worth emphasizing that these conditions are sufficient but not necessary, i.e., 
multiple stable equilibria may arise even in the absence of these conditions.
Taken together, these conditions suggest that multiple stable equilibria could eas-
ily—if not quite likely—arise with realistic parameter values for the average cost 
and willingness-to-pay functions. The next subsection presents simulation evidence 
supporting multiplicity under a risk distribution calibrated from US data.
C. A Calibration Based on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
To examine the potential for the type of multiple equilibria shown in Figure 8, we 
now present a simple quantification of the model. We start with a simple baseline 
scenario where household types differ in their probability of an identical loss. For 
robustness, we then consider several variations, including different wealth construc-
tions as well as focusing on self-employed and uninsured households. Appendix B 
presents a calibration based on the case where household types face the same loss 
probability across different loss amounts. The key lessons are the same in both sets 
of calculations.
Baseline Scenario.—In our baseline scenario, we use data from the 2010 Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for the pre-Medicare population (ages 18–64) 
to calibrate the average cost (AC) and demand curves.23 The calculations, there-
fore, correspond to the pre-ACA population to avoid conflating the potential impacts 
from the ACA itself.
Figure 11 shows the average cost curve as well as the willingness-to-pay curves at 
different levels of risk aversion. The horizontal axis corresponds to the top  X percent 
of spenders, where  X (the “rank”) is the shown value.24 The vertical axis is denomi-
nated in dollars. The average cost curve simply sorts medical spenders by percentile. 
For example, the mean health expenditure per person in the top 100 percent of the 
population (i.e., the entire population mean) is equal to $3,844, increasing to $7,476 
for population in the top 50 percent, and climbing to $38,147 for the top 5 percent.
Of course, an important question is how much of this (ex post) heterogeneity 
corresponds to (ex ante) private information of individuals. On one extreme, the 
cost distribution could entirely result from ex post risk, where all individuals have 
the same expected costs and, therefore, no private information. In this case, the AC 
curve would be flat and there would be no adverse selection. On the other extreme, 
all of the distribution could be driven by heterogeneous individuals with private 
information about their (deterministic) health expenditures. Instead, we take an 
intermediate stance that is closest to our formal model. In particular, we distin-
guish quantiles including the top  X percent of spenders, with X ∈ {5, 10, 20, 25, 30, 
23 As verification, we used data kindly provided by Cohen and Uberoi (2013), and we also directly did our own 
analysis on the 2010 MEPS data for robustness. 
24 Notice that the horizontal axis in Figure 11, denoted in  X percent, has the same ordering as the horizontal 
axis in the previous figures, denoted in  π . Rightward movements in both imply greater risk. However, the support 
itself is now bounded above zero. In particular, the left-most point of 100 percent in Figure 11 now corresponds to a 
willingness to pay that is greater than zero since the average person in the bottom 50 percent of spenders now faces 
a chance of loss greater than zero. In contrast, in the previous figures, the left-most point of  π = 0 corresponded 
to a person who faced no chance of loss. 
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50, 100} and assume that individuals only have private information about which of 
these bins they belong to.25
We calibrate the marginal willingness to pay for insurance for each of the shown 
percentiles as follows. First, we assume throughout a constant relative risk aversion 
utility function  u(c ) =  c 1−α / (1 − α) , where  α is the level of risk aversion. Second, 
for this calibration, the constant loss value  l is derived from equation (1) by using 
the average cost of the top 5 percent of the population from the MEPS and setting 
with  π 5% = 1 for them. Third, given this fixed loss value, the (marginal) value of  π 
is then calculated recursively (from the top) at each value of  X by solving equation 
(1) for  π .26 (Hence, the value of  π increases as the shown value of  X decreases.) 
Finally, for a given value of  α , the demand curve is then calculated by solving equa-
tion (2) for the value of  Ω for each value of  π , and hence  X . The value of wealth  w in 
equation (2) is initially set equal to the median net worth found in the 2010 Survey 
of Consumer Finances (Bricker et al. 2012), which assumes that the probability of a 
loss is independent of the household’s wealth.
25 We have performed robustness checks with even fewer bins and found similar results. 
26 For instance, to compute the probability  π 10% of the loss for the top 10-5 percent of spenders, we solve 
 (0.5  π 10% + 0.5  π 5% ) l = A C 10% , where we take the average costs  A C 10% and  l = A C 5% from the MEPS data and set π 5% = 1 .  π 20% is then obtained from solving  (0.5  π 20% + 0.25  π 10% + 0.25  π 5% ) l = A C 20% , etc. 
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Figure 11. Willingness to Pay and Average Costs: Median Net Worth
Note: Wealth equals net worth (assets less liabilities), including net housing wealth.
Source: 2010 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
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Consider first the case of  α = 3 . Notice that the willingness-to-pay curve is 
always smaller than the AC curve (i.e.,  Ω(X%) < Γ(X%) except at the top rank—the 
smallest shown value of  X —where both curves join). This outcome corresponds to 
the full unraveling case shown previously in Figure 5. Intuitively, at this compara-
tively small level of risk aversion, agents with a smaller loss probability  π (located at 
larger values of  X on the horizontal axis) are willing to forgo insurance, pushing up 
its average cost, thereby leading to unraveling as the value of  X gets smaller. Now, 
consider the case of  α = 5 . In this case, the willingness-to-pay curve intersects the 
AC curve just once before again joining the AC curve at the smallest value of  X . 
Since at the good equilibrium (close to the top 50 percent of spenders), the demand 
curve intersects the cost curve from below, we know from Section IV that it is stable, 
whereas the equilibrium at the top 5 percent is unstable. Starting from any initial 
condition, the dynamics will bring the market to the stable equilibrium located at the 
larger rank, with more than half of the population being covered, consistent with a 
comparatively large level of risk aversion.
Finally, consider the in-between case where  α = 4 . The willingness-to-pay and 
AC curves now intersect at three places, at the shown stable “good” and “bad” equi-
libria and an unstable intermediate equilibrium. Notice that the sharply rising AC 
curve as the rank  X grows smaller plays a critical role in causing these multiple 
intersections. As we know from Proposition 3, multiple equilibria are more likely 
to be produced as losses become more concentrated. Indeed, health costs are much 
more concentrated than many other types of insurable losses. By Proposition 2, ini-
tial conditions matter: if we start from a point to the right of the unstable equilibrium 
(covering somewhere between the top 10 and 20 percent of the population in terms 
of spending), the dynamics converge to the worst equilibrium with only the top 5 
percent covered. Otherwise, we eventually reach the best equilibrium between the 
top 20 and 25 percent quantiles.
Robustness: Median Liquid Assets.—To check the robustness of our results to var-
ious assumptions, Figure 12 repeats the same calculations assuming that wealth  w is 
now set equal to the median liquid assets reported in the 2010 Survey of Consumer 
Finances. (Hence, the AC curve remains unchanged.) Liquid assets are a potentially 
more accurate measure of the relevant amount of wealth when illiquid assets, mainly 
housing, cannot be legally confiscated to pay for medical bills. Because the value of 
liquid assets is smaller than the median net worth, we can consider relatively smaller 
values of  α in our comparisons.
The reason why the highest willingness to pay no longer also joins the AC curve at 
its highest point is due to limited liability. The calibrated loss amount  l now exceeds 
the wealth level  w , and so the maximum potential loss is capped at  w .27 By Corollary 
1, we know that the presence of limited liability generally enhances the likelihood of 
equilibrium multiplicity by reducing the slope of the willingness-to-pay curve in the 
same neighborhood where the slope of the AC curve is increasing.
27 In the actual simulations, we cap the loss at  w less $1,000. Not only does this threshold avoid “almost” infinite 
marginal utility states, it roughly corresponds with Medicaid qualifications as well. 
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Notice that the smallest value of  α , now set equal to 1, produces a willingness-to- 
pay curve that is always below the AC curve, corresponding to the case of a single 
(corner) equilibrium with full unraveling at  0 percent (not shown). But we get three 
equilibria for the other two values of  α . In particular, the largest value of  α , now 
set equal to 3, produces just one intersection, corresponding to an unstable equilib-
rium. But this unstable equilibrium falls in-between two corner stable equilibria: a 
stable corner equilibrium at  100 percent where everyone buys insurance (where the 
willingness to pay exceeds the average cost of the entire population) and another 
stable corner equilibria at  0 percent (not shown) where nobody buys insurance. For 
the in-between value of  α , now set equal to 2, we have a stable interior equilibrium, 
followed by an unstable equilibrium at a larger value of  X , followed by a corner 
stable equilibrium at  0 percent (not shown) where nobody buys insurance.
Robustness: Assets and Probability Loss Probability Increase with Age.—By 
focusing on median wealth for all cost quantiles, our estimates, however, have not 
accounted for the fact that both the size of wealth and the probability of loss tend 
to increase in age. For additional robustness, Figure 13 shows the effect of assum-
ing that rank now grows linearly in age, where 18-year olds are now effectively 
located at the 100 percent mark on the horizontal axis while 64-year-olds are located 
at the 5 percent mark. We can now also use the median values of liquid assets at 
each age from the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances. Notice that allowing for this 
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Figure 12. Willingness to Pay and Average Costs: Median Liquid Assets
Note: Wealth equals liquid assets only.
Source: 2010 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
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 relationship has very little impact on our results. Relative to Figure 12, the effects of 
limited liability are now absent because older people tend to have both more assets 
and a higher probability of loss.
Robustness: Self-Employed.—Figure 14 repeats the baseline scenario but now 
only includes people who identified as self-employed in the 2010 MEPS. This sub-
population might be more relevant than the general population for the ACA expe-
rience, since these individuals do not have access to employer-provided health 
insurance and, therefore, are more likely to demand insurance on the exchanges. 
The results from the baseline scenario are basically the same, except that a smaller 
risk aversion,  α = 3 , can now produce multiple equilibria, compared to  α = 4 in the 
baseline scenario.
Robustness: Uninsured.—Figure 15 repeats the baseline scenario but now only 
includes people who were identified as uninsured in the 2010 MEPS. Again, this 
was the population targeted by the ACA health exchanges. The wealth of uninsured 
households is set equal to half of median net worth, consistent with previous stud-
ies showing that uninsured households hold less wealth (e.g., Bernard, Banthin, 
and Encinosa 2009). The results from the baseline scenario are, again, basically the 
same, except that an even smaller risk aversion,  α = 1.5 , can now produce multiple 
equilibria.
Figure 13. Willingness to Pay and Average Costs: Risk Increasing by Age
Note: Wealth equals liquid assets only.
Source: 2010 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
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Robustness: Fixed Probability, Variable Losses.—Appendix B presents additional 
estimates that relax the assumption that the size of loss is fixed across different risk 
types. In particular, the probability of loss is now held fixed across households, and 
a risk type is now defined in terms of the heterogenous size of loss. As before, a 
low level of risk aversion  α leads to unraveling. Moreover, the in-between level of 
risk aversion produces multiple stable equilibria. However, unlike before, even large 
values of risk aversion now produce multiple stable equilibria. The generalization 
provided in Appendix B also demonstrates that similar quantitative exercises could 
be performed while allowing for richer forms of heterogeneity.
Summary.—Overall, therefore, the empirical evidence is consistent with the 
potential for multiple equilibria, especially for moderate values of risk aversion and 
when loss sizes are not fixed (Appendix B). To be sure, the calculations in this 
section focus on the pre-ACA population and do not include the impact of absolute 
fines for nonparticipation or the impact of subsidies to lower-income households 
who do participate. However, the next section shows that fines and subsidies shift 
up the inverse demand curve (potentially with some rotation due to means test-
ing), thereby lowering the required level of risk aversion that is needed to achieve 
multiple equilibria. On the one hand, fines and subsidies can help reduce the likeli-
hood of multiple, stable equilibria that would have otherwise existed without these 
provisions. On the other hand, fines and subsidies can also induce multiple, stable 
equilibria in a setting where multiple equilibria would have otherwise not existed, 
Figure 14. Willingness to Pay and Average Costs: Self-Employed
Note: Wealth equals median net worth.
Source: 2010 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
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for example, at lower levels of risk aversion. The net effect of fines and subsidies on 
multiple, stable equilibria, therefore, is ambiguous.
Future work can simulate a life-cycle model with more detail, including the 
interaction of the ACA with other social insurance. For example, using a detailed 
micro-simulation model, Zewde (2017) shows that ACA subsidies are dominated 
by bankruptcy protection for many uninsured households. Consistently, a majority 
of uninsured households eligible for ACA subsidies have chosen not to participate 
(Levitt et al. 2016).
V. Extension: Fines and Subsidies
Given the previous experience in the states, the mandate—in reality, the asso-
ciated fine that gives the mandate its force—has been widely viewed as one of the 
important ingredients for the ACA to succeed. Indeed, the mandate was the focus 
of the challenge to the ACA heard by the Supreme Court in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius. Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2011) presents 
evidence that the phase-in of the mandate in the Massachusetts plan encouraged 
healthier consumers to enroll, and Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2015) esti-
mate the socially optimal level of the penalty that enforces the mandate in a model 
with linear cost and demand curves.
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Figure 15. Willingness to Pay and Average Costs: Uninsured
Note: Wealth equals one-half median net worth.
Source: 2010 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
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In this section, we show that the actual form of the fine, and not just its level, 
plays an important role in the presence of equilibrium multiplicity. For most house-
holds, the ACA imposes an absolute fine—a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of 
income, whichever is greater—whereas the Massachusetts reform in 2006 created 
a relative fine that was a function of market premium prices. Only for high-income 
households, the ACA penalty is effectively premium-dependent because it is capped 
at the national average of market premiums for the bronze plan (even if it were not, 
individuals would always prefer to buy such a plan rather than pay a higher fine any-
ways, so in effect this cap would always emerge). In addition to the fine, the ACA 
also makes subsidies available to households with lower income.
A. Absolute Fine and Subsidy
We begin by demonstrating how the introduction of an absolute fine  f for not 
having insurance as well as a subsidy  s for having insurance can be captured in our 
graphical framework. Of course, neither the fine nor the subsidy affects the average 
cost curve  Γ(π) . However, they affect the construction of the willingness to pay for 
insurance, now denoted as  Ω ˆ (π) , through the modified indifference condition
(7)  u(w −  Ω ˆ + s ) = πu(w − f − l ) + (1 − π ) u(w − f ). 
Notice that the subsidy  s and the fine  f both shift up the inverse demand curve 
Ω ˆ (π) —in fact, in a parallel manner in the case of a subsidy. Notice that poten-
tially numerous combinations of fines and subsidies can, therefore, actually induce 
multiple, stable equilibria in settings where they would have otherwise not existed, 
including in many of the calibration exercises in Section III with more modest levels 
of risk aversion. Given its greater complexity and its historical focus in ACA-related 
debates, we, therefore, focus on the construction of the fine  f .
Unsurprisingly, an absolute fine could also give rise to better equilibria with more 
individuals insured. In the example previously shown in Figure 5, where only the 
complete unraveling equilibrium exists, shifting up the  Ω ˆ -curve will induce the 
emergence of an equilibria where a positive mass of individuals get coverage. For 
the example shown in Figure 8 with three equilibria, Figure 16 illustrates how shift-
ing up the  Ω ˆ -curve can shrink the range of initial values  ( π ˆ 2 ∗ , 1] for which unraveling 
to the bad stable equilibrium  π 3 ∗ occurs. It also shifts both the good stable equilib-
rium  π 1 ∗ and the bad stable equilibrium  π 3 ∗ to the left and, hence, leads to a greater 
number of individuals being covered at a lower premium.
B. Speed of Adjustment
The speed of adjustment to a positive fine is material after a reform like the ACA 
that shifts the willingness-to-pay schedule  Ω(π) and/or the average cost curve  Γ(π) . 
The pre-reform equilibrium, denoted as  π pre , is, of course, no longer an equilibrium 
after the policy change. If  π pre is larger than the post-reform value of the unstable 
equilibrium with no fine,  π 2 ∗, then the market will unravel toward the new bad stable 
equilibrium after the reform. Let  f post denote the minimum value of the fine that 
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is necessary to shift the market from the new bad stable equilibrium to the new 
good equilibrium. Similarly, let  f pre denote the minimum value of the fine that is 
necessary to shift the market from the pre-reform equilibrium  π pre to the new good 
equilibrium. It is easy to see from Figure 16 that  f post >  f pre . In other words, a delay 
in implementing a fine after a policy change could require a larger fine to obtain the 
good equilibrium relative to a fine that is introduced with the reform itself. More 
generally, an incremental increase in the value of the fine over time—as done in the 
ACA—could result in a larger fine being necessary to eventually shift the market to 
the good equilibrium.
C. A Pareto Improving Shift to a Relative Fine
Of course, we can always set the fine to be large enough such that there exists 
a unique equilibrium where everyone buys insurance and there is no risk of unrav-
eling. However, this outcome may be both inefficient and politically challenging. 
Indeed, the peculiar nature of the fine’s construction under the ACA—namely, its 
assessment only on tax filers who are owed a refund along with generous exclusions 
for financial hardship—reflects the sensitivity that Congress felt it faced in creating 
a fine that causes too much hardship.
A more interesting question, therefore, is whether there exists another fine mech-
anism that eliminates the possibility of equilibrium multiplicity without imposing 
a higher fine in the best equilibrium  π 1 ∗. As Figure 16 makes clear, it is actually not 
necessary to impose a higher fine everywhere in order to eliminate the bad stable 
equilibria. A large fine value is only necessary in situations where few individuals 
enroll for insurance, that is, where the critical value of  π and, hence, the premium 
are both large.
Figure 16.  Enforcement of a Mandate through a Fine f
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A relative fine that is tied to the actual equilibrium premium in the market achieves 
exactly this outcome. Using the dynamics developed in Section IV, suppose that in 
each period  t , the fine that must be paid by uninsured consumers is set equal to  k  p t , 
where  k > 0 is some constant that can be interpreted as the percentage of the current 
premium  p t .
28 Since  p t = Γ( π t ) , the resulting willingness to pay for insurance, now 
denoted as  Ω ̃ (π) , for each risk level  π is then defined implicitly by
(8) u (w −  Ω ̃ ) = πu (w − l − kΓ (π) ) +  (1 − π) u (w − kΓ (π) ) .29
The benefit of the relative fine is that the fine value—and, hence, consumers’ 
demand for insurance—automatically increase as the market unravels toward a bad 
stable equilibrium. This outcome occurs even if we choose  k such that  kΓ(  π ˆ 1 ∗) = f , 
so the relative and the absolute fines take exactly the same value in the best equilib-
rium  π ˆ 1 ∗. This is illustrated in Figure 17, which shows how the inverse demand curve 
under the relative fine  Ω ̃ (π) is a counterclockwise rotation at point  π ˆ 1 ∗ relative to the 
inverse demand curve under the absolute fine  Ω ˆ (π) . Proposition 4 formalizes the 
advantages of a relative fine compared to an absolute fine with this normalization.
PROPOSITION 4: Let  π ˆ 1 ∗ < 1 be the best equilibrium under an absolute fine 
f > 0 , and set the relative fine such that  kΓ( π ˆ 1 ∗) = f (i.e., equal fine values at the 
best equilibrium). Then:
 (i) for any number  N ≥ 1 of equilibria, the worst equilibrium  π ̃ N ∗ under the rel-
ative fine is Pareto better (more coverage at a lower price) than the worst 
equilibrium under the absolute fine  π ˆ N ∗ , i.e.,  π ̃ N ∗ ≤  π ˆ N ∗ .
 (ii) The best equilibrium under the absolute and relative fine are identical, 
i.e.,  π ˆ 1 ∗ =  π ̃ 1 ∗.
 (iii) The interval of initial conditions [0,  π –̃ 1 ) from which we converge to the best 
equilibrium  π ̃ 1 ∗ under the relative fine is larger than the range of initial con-
ditions [0,  π – ˆ1 ) from which we converge to the best equilibrium  π ˆ 1 ∗ =  π ̃ 1 ∗ under 
the absolute fine, i.e.,  π –̃ 1 ≥  π –ˆ 1 .
PROOF: See Appendix.
In sum, a reconstruction of the fine toward a relative basis is more likely to expand 
coverage by moving the market to the good stable equilibrium without costing non-
insured consumers anything more in the good equilibrium. However, even if the bad 
stable equilibrium does emerge (which may still be possible under a small enough 
relative fine), its “badness” is also reduced (more coverage at a lower price). A shift 
28 In the case of Massachusetts, the corresponding value of  k would roughly equal  1 / 2 . 
29 Notice that since Γ(π) is increasing, the right-hand side of (8) is still decreasing in π, and so  Ω ̃ (π) remains 
well-defined and increasing.
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from an absolute fine, which exists under the ACA for all households who do not 
prefer to buy coverage anyways, to a properly constructed relative fine, which pre-
viously existed in the Massachusetts plan, is Pareto improving.30
While the normalization  kΓ( π ˆ 1 ∗) = f requires knowledge of the best equilibrium 
on the part of the policymaker, part (i) of Proposition 4 can be shown to go through 
under the weaker condition that  kΓ(π) = f for some  π <  π ˆ N ∗ . In other words, when-
ever the relative fine is set such that it coincides with the absolute fine for some suf-
ficiently low premium level (below the one corresponding to the worst equilibrium), 
the worst equilibrium under the relative fine is better than the worst equilibrium 
under the absolute fine. Moreover, when the relative and absolute fine are equal 
under a premium level sufficiently close to the best equilibrium, parts (ii) and (iii) 
also go through in an approximate sense. Hence, for practical purposes, the relative 
fine dominates the absolute fine under weaker informational requirements than sug-
gested by the exact result in the proposition.
D. Relative to No Fine
It is worth noting that simply introducing a fine for nonparticipation typically 
does not lead to a Pareto improvement relative to no fine. The reason is that there 
are usually individuals with sufficiently low  π who, in any equilibrium without a 
fine, prefer to demand no insurance (in particular, this is always true in our baseline 
30 The same is true for subsidies that are a function of average market premiums rather than just income- 
dependent. Indeed, the construction of subsidies in the ACA indirectly implies some degree of premium dependence 
because, for instance, people whose income is between 100 percent and 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level 
receive subsidies so that their premium contribution amounts to no more than 2 percent of their income. Our analy-
sis reveals that these features are highly desirable beyond their purely redistributive benefits. 
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Figure 17. Relative versus Absolute Fine with  kΓ( π ˆ 1 ∗ ) = f 
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model with full support for  π ). With a fine in place, they will either remain unin-
sured and pay the fine or, if the fine is high enough, buy insurance at a premium that 
is higher than their original willingness to pay. In either case, they will be worse 
off. Hence, a fine or mandate can increase coverage but typically not in a Pareto 
improving way.31
Even when relaxing the assumption that  π has full support on  [0, 1] , as in Appendix 
B (as well as in the model calibrated to the MEPS data considered earlier), a Pareto 
improvement from introducing a fine is possible only in the presence of multiple 
equilibria, when the fine induces a shift from a bad equilibrium with low coverage to 
a good equilibrium where in fact everyone gets covered, and everyone being covered 
is an equilibrium even without the fine. Only this outcome guarantees that nobody 
ends up paying the fine and even the lowest risk types actually prefer buying insur-
ance when everyone does so, so they are better off compared to the bad equilibrium 
(see e.g., Figure 18 in Appendix B). Explicitly accounting for equilibrium multiplic-
ity, therefore, crucially underlies standard arguments for Pareto improving mandates 
or fines in the context of adverse selection. Nonetheless, given the existence of an 
absolute fine, an appropriate shift to a relative fine is Pareto improving.
VI. Conclusion
This paper documents empirically that states that suffered poor exogenous “ini-
tial conditions” in the ACA marketplace, in the form of website failures at launch, 
appear to be stuck in a permanent position with higher average costs. This result 
is not consistent with the standard insurance model with strategic pricing. Nor is 
this result consistent with price-taking models with linear average cost and inverse 
demand curves, which are ubiquitous in the literature. We then characterize when the 
“initial conditions” of a new insurance market could have permanent consequences. 
Initial conditions can be material if insurers are competitive price-takers, and if there 
exist at least three competitive equilibria. Existing evidence from previous health 
care reforms at the state level and from some employer-based plans suggests that 
insurers, indeed, update their prices consistent with the price-taking model.
While some previous papers have noted the possibility of multiple equilibria, 
this paper appears to be first to formalize the conditions required to have multiple 
stable equilibria, which are the only equilibria that are relevant for policy purposes. 
We also provide some suggestive empirical evidence using the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey that the presence of three equilibria is indeed consistent with moder-
ate to low levels of risk aversion. Multiple equilibria are also more likely to emerge 
when losses are very concentrated (as is the case of health care) and in the presence 
of limited liability.
Moreover, the presence of subsidies and fines have an ambiguous impact on the 
presence of multiple, stable equilibria. While these provisions can reduce the impact 
of multiple equilibria that otherwise would exist, these provisions can also induce 
multiple equilibria in settings where they would otherwise not exist. Moreover, 
31 This argument goes through unaffected when the revenue from the fine is returned lump sum to all individu-
als, or when the fine on nonparticipants is replaced by a subsidy for participation that is financed by a lump-sum tax. 
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we demonstate that equilibrium multiplicity is a necessary condition for a fine to 
achieve a Pareto improvement. The ACA’s fine is currently constructed as an abso-
lute amount, equal to the greater of a fixed dollar amount or a fixed fraction of 
income (it is capped at the premium of the lowest-coverage plan, but the affected 
households strictly prefer buying such a plan to paying this maximum fine in any 
case). In contrast, the 2006 Massachusetts plan, on which the ACA is modeled, 
levied a fine on a relative basis, equal to a fraction of the equilibrium premium. The 
relative fine, therefore, grows with the amount of adverse selection. We show that 
changing the fine from an absolute to a relative amount—normalized to be equal in 
the desired, good equilibrium—increases the range of initial conditions consistent 
with reaching the good equilibrium, while also reducing the severity of the bad equi-
librium, if it still exists. The shift, therefore, would be Pareto improving.
Future work can explore related policy questions. For example, there could be 
good reasons for limitations to the frequency of price changes and the amount of 
increases, such as consumer protection. However, a potential unintended conse-
quence is that they also further discourage price discovery, thereby increasing the 
potential for reaching a Pareto dominated equilibrium.
Appendix A: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
 (i) We show that initial conditions cannot matter when there are only one or 
two competitive equilibria. If  π ∗ = 1 is the only equilibrium, we must have 
Γ(π ) > Ω(π) for all  π < 1 . Otherwise, by continuity of  Γ and  Ω and since 
Γ(0 ) = E [ Π ] l > Ω(0) = 0 , there would have to exist at least one intersection 
of  Γ and  Ω at some  π < 1 and hence another equilibrium. Since  Γ(π) > Ω(π) 
for all  π < 1 , the dynamics imply unraveling to  π ∗ = 1 for any initial  π and 
therefore initial conditions do not matter.
   If there are two equilibria with  π ∗ = 1 and some  π 1 ∗ < 1 , it must hold that Γ(π) > Ω(π) for all  π ∈ [0,  π 1 ∗ ) and  Γ(π) < Ω(π) for all  π ∈ ( π 1 ∗, 1) by an 
analogous argument as above. Hence, for any  π ∈ [0, 1) , we converge to the 
constrained efficient equilibrium  π 1 ∗ < 1 . As a result, initial conditions again 
do not matter for the equilibrium that is eventually reached except in the non-
generic case where the initial  π = 1 .
 (ii) and (iii) Note first that, for any number  N of equilibria  π 1 ∗ < ⋯ < π N−1 ∗ < 1 , the best equilibrium  π 1 ∗ must be stable generically. This is because Γ(π) > Ω(π) for all  π ∈ [0,  π 1 ∗ ) and, since there is a proper intersection of  Γ 
and  Ω generically,  Γ(π) < Ω(π) for all  π ∈ ( π 1 ∗,  π –1 ) and  π –1 >  π 1 ∗ sufficiently 
close to  π 1 ∗. With exactly three competitive equilibria  π 1 ∗ <  π 2 ∗ < 1 , this 
implies that in fact  π –1 =  π 2 ∗, and since again there is a proper intersection of Γ and  Ω at  π 2 ∗ generically,  Γ(π) > Ω(π) for all  ( π 2 ∗, 1) , as illustrated in Figure 
9. Hence, the intermediate equilibrium  π 2 ∗ is unstable and the other two are 
stable. Moreover, we converge to  π 1 ∗ for any initial  π <  π 2 ∗ and to  π ∗ = 1 for 
any  π >  π 2 ∗. ∎
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Solving the definition of  Ω(π) in (2) yields
  Ω(π) = w − c(πu(w − l ) + (1 − π )u(w)), 
where  c(u) denotes the inverse function of  u(c) . This implies
  Ω ′ (π ) =  u(w )  − u(w − l)  __________________________   
 u ′ (c(πu(w − l ) + (1 − π ) u(w ))) > 0, 
where we used  c ′ (u ) = 1/ u ′ (c(u)) . Evaluating at  π = 1 delivers
  Ω ′ (1) =  u(w ) − u(w − l)  _____________
 u ′ (w − l) > 0. 
However, differentiating the definition of  Γ(π) = E [ Π | Π ≥ π ] l from (1) yields
  Γ   ′(π)  =  h(π) _______ 1 − H(π)  (E [Π | Π ≥ π] − π) l  ≥  0.
Using L’Hospital’s rule, we obtain
  Γ ′ (1) ≡  lim π→1Γ ′ (π) =  l _ 2 . 
Hence, we have  Γ ′ (1) <  Ω ′ (1) if condition (i) in the proposition is satisfied. Together 
with  Γ(1) = Ω(1) = l , this implies  Γ(π ) > Ω(π) in an interval  [1 − ϵ, 1) for some 
ϵ > 0 . Hence, there exists a stable competitive equilibrium at  π ∗ = 1 . Note that con-
dition (6) is satisfied whenever  l is sufficiently small because
  lim 
l→0  
u(w) − u(w − l)
  _____________
l
 =  u ′ (w) > 0. 
It is also satisfied if  u is not too concave since with  u   ″ = 0 we have
  
u(w )  − u(w − l)
  _____________
l
 =  u ′ (w − l ) >   u ′ (w − l) _
2
 . 
Next, under condition (ii) in the proposition, as  Δ, ε → 0 , we have  E [ Π ] → a 
and hence  Γ(π) = E[Π | Π ≥ π] l → a  ∀ π ≤ a . In particular, this implies 
Γ(a) → a < Ω(a) since  Ω(π) > π for all  π ∈ (0, 1) by risk aversion. Because 
Ω(0) = 0 < Γ(0) ≈ la and by continuity of  Ω and  Γ , there must therefore exist a 
stable equilibrium with  Ω( π ∗ ) = Γ( π ∗ ) for some  π ∗ ∈ (0, a) . Finally, taken together 
with the above result that  Ω(π) < Γ(π) in the left-neighborhood of  π = 1 and again 
by continuity, this implies that there must exist at least one unstable equilibrium in 
(a, 1) . ∎
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 1:
When individuals are only liable for losses up to  L < l , their demand for insur-
ance is determined by
 u(w − Ω) = πu(w − L) + πu(w), 
so  Ω(1) = L < Γ(1) = l . By the same argument as in the first part of the proof of 
Proposition 3, this ensures the existence of a stable “corner” equilibrium at  π = 1 , 
i.e., where no one buys insurance (and the willingness to pay of even the highest 
risk types is below their average costs). When  L is not too small, a sufficiently con-
centrated distribution  H(π) ensures the existence of the other equilibria by the same 
argument as in the second part of the proof of Proposition 3. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Note first that, for any absolute fine  f > 0 ,  Ω ˆ (1) = l + f > Γ(1) = l , so for any 
number  N of equilibria, both the best equilibrium  π ˆ 1 ∗ and the worst equilibrium  π ˆ N ∗  
under  f must satisfy  π ˆ 1 ∗ ≤  π ˆ N ∗ < 1 . We next observe that, comparing the definitions (7) and (8) and using the normalization that  kΓ( π ˆ 1 ∗ ) = f and the fact that  Γ(π) is 
increasing in  π ,  Ω ̃ (π) <  Ω ˆ (π) for all  π <  π ˆ 1 ∗ and  Ω ̃ (π) >  Ω ˆ (π) for all  π >  π ˆ 1 ∗. We 
use this repeatedly to prove claims (i) to (iii) in the proposition.
 (i) Since  Ω ˆ (1) > Γ(1) under  f > 0 , the worst equilibrium  π ˆ N ∗ < 1 must be 
such that  Ω ˆ (π) > Γ(π) for all  π >  π ˆ N ∗ . Since  π ˆ N ∗ ≥  π ˆ 1 ∗, the above result that Ω ̃ (π) >  Ω ˆ (π) for all  π >  π ˆ 1 ∗ a fortiori implies  Ω ̃ (π) >  Ω ˆ (π) > Γ(π) for all π >  π ˆ N ∗ . This immediately rules out  π ̃ N ∗ >  π ˆ N ∗ .
 (ii) and (iii) Note first that the best equilibrium  π ˆ 1 ∗ is always such that  Ω ˆ (π) < Γ(π) for all  π <  π ˆ 1 ∗. Moreover, since we observed that  Ω ̃ (π) <  Ω ˆ (π) for all π <  π ˆ 1 ∗, we also have  Ω ̃ (π) < Γ(π) for all  π <  π ˆ 1 ∗ ≤  π ̃ 1 ∗. Hence, the range of 
initial values from which we converge to the best equilibrium always takes 
the form of an interval with lower bound zero and upper bound  π –1  ≥  π ˆ 1 ∗. Since 
 Ω ̃ (π) >  Ω ˆ (π) for all  π >  π ˆ 1 ∗ and  Ω ̃ ( π ˆ 1 ∗) =  Ω ˆ ( π ˆ 1 ∗ ) , we also have  π ̃ 1 ∗ =  π ˆ 1 ∗, as 
claimed in (ii).
   Suppose first that the best equilibrium  π ˆ 1 ∗ < 1 is the unique equilibrium 
under the absolute fine  f , so  Ω ˆ (π) > Γ(π) for all  π >  π ˆ 1 ∗ and vice versa. Then, 
by the above observation that  Ω ̃ (π ) >  Ω ˆ (π) for all  π >  π ˆ 1 ∗ and vice versa, 
this immediately implies that  π ̃ 1 ∗ =  π ˆ 1 ∗ is also the unique equilibrium under 
the relative fine. It also implies that, in both cases, the best equilibrium is 
globally stable, so we converge to it for any initial conditions, and thus  π –̃ 1 = π –ˆ 1 = 1.
   Otherwise, since the best equilibrium  π ˆ 1 ∗ generically corresponds to a proper 
intersection of  Ω ˆ (π) and  Γ(π) and  Ω ˆ (π) < Γ(π) for all  π <  π ˆ 1 ∗, we must have 
 Ω ˆ (π) > Γ(π) for some interval  ( π ˆ 1 ∗,  π –ˆ 1 ) with  π –ˆ 1 >  π ˆ 1 ∗. Hence, under the 
absolute fine, we converge to  π ˆ 1 ∗ for any initial  π in the interval  [0,  π –ˆ 1 ) . Then 
the above observation that  Ω ̃ (π) >  Ω ˆ (π) for all  π >  π ˆ 1 ∗ immediately implies Ω ̃ (π) > Γ(π) for some interval   ( π ˆ 1 ∗,  π –ˆ 1 ) with  π –̃ 1 >  π –ˆ 1 . The range of initial 
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values for  π for which we converge to the best equilibrium under the relative 
fine is therefore  [0,  π –ˆ 1 ) with  π –̃ 1 >  π –ˆ 1 . ∎
Appendix B: Generalizing the Price-Taking Model
This Appendix generalizes the model of Section III to allow for the presence of 
discrete risk types, a richer amount of heterogeneity between consumers and more 
general variation in the size of losses.
A. Allowing for Discrete Risk Types
We now show multiple equilibria can emerge even when we relax the assump-
tion that the distribution of types  H(π) is continuous with full support on  [0, 1] . For 
example, consider a case with three risk types,  0 <  π L <  π M <  π H < 1 , of low ( L ), 
medium ( M ), and high ( H ) risk, respectively. Their willingness to pay for insurance 
Ω(π) is depicted as black dots in Figure 18. The empty circles represent the average 
costs of insuring the corresponding pools, and so  Γ( π H ) is the cost of only insuring 
the high risk type  H ,  Γ( π M ) is the average cost of insuring both the medium  M and 
high risk  H types, and  Γ( π L ) = E[ Π ] l is the average cost of insuring all three risk 
types.
We have chosen these values such that there are two competitive equilibria: one 
good equilibrium in which everyone is insured at premium  p 1 = E[ Π ] l , and another 
bad equilibrium in which only the high risk type is insured at a higher premium 
p 2 =  π H l >  p 1 .32 There is no equilibrium where only the medium and high types 
32 With discrete types, competitive equilibria involve points with  Ω(π) ≥ Γ(π) rather than necessarily 
Ω(π) = Γ(π) . However, Definition 1 still applies. For instance, in the competitive equilibrium with premium 
Ω(pi)
Γ(pi)
p
p  = 
l
  piM 10  pi pi   piH L 
E [Π] l
1
p  = pi  l
2 H
Figure 18. Equilibrium Multiplicity with Three Types
VOL. 10 NO. 4 339SCHEUER AND SMETTERS: PERMANENT EFFECTS OF INITIAL CONDITIONS
π M and  π H are insured, because the average cost  Γ( π M ) for that pool is higher than 
the willingness to pay of the medium type  Ω( π M ) , so the medium risk type would 
not buy insurance at premium  Γ( π M ) and the dynamics would unravel to the bad 
equilibrium.
Let us connect Figure 18 to the corresponding figures that we drew for the case 
of a continuum of types in Sections II to IV. Filling up the space between the three 
discrete types naturally leads to Figure 19. We see that, with continuous types and 
this pattern of curves, there are in fact three equilibria: a stable bad equilibrium, 
where only types π ≥  _ π 2 are insured (with  π M <  _ π2 <  π H ), an unstable interior 
equilibrium with critical type  
_
 π1 between  π L and  π H , and a stable corner equilib-
rium where everyone with  π ≥  π L is insured. Notice that Figure 19 is very similar 
to Figure 8 shown in Section IV. In particular, for initial conditions to matter, the 
existence of an unstable equilibrium is still required, and the average cost and will-
ingness-to-pay curves need to intersect at least twice in the interior. Moreover, the 
marginal buyer  
_
 π1 in the unstable equilibrium represents the critical value of initial 
conditions that determines whether the good or bad equilibrium is reached even-
tually. The only difference between the discrete and the continuous cases is that 
the highest risk type in the discrete case may lay within the support shown for the 
continuous case.
p 2 , we have  Ω( π L )  < Ω( π M ) <  p 2 < Ω( π H ) , so that only the highest type  π H demands insurance. Moreover, 
p 2 = Γ( π H ) =  π H l , and insurers make zero profits. 
Ω(pi)
Γ(pi)
p
l
  piM 10  pi pi   piH L  pi  1  pi  2 
Figure 19. Connection between Continuous and Discrete Type Model
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B. Richer Forms of Consumer Heterogeneity and Multiple Loss Sizes
It is also straightforward to extend our analysis in Sections II to IV to allow for 
richer forms of consumer heterogeneity and multiple sizes of losses. Let the popula-
tion be indexed by the continuous variable  θ ∈ [0, 1] with distribution  F(θ) . Suppose 
there are  S possible loss levels  l s (θ) indexed by  s , which may differ across  θ . The 
probability that type  θ suffers a loss of size  s is denoted by  π s (θ) , where, of course, ∑ s=1 S  π s (θ) = 1  ∀ θ . The expected loss for type  θ is, therefore,
  ∑ 
s=1
S
  π s (θ)  l s (θ). 
We can normalize the population type index  θ so that the expected costs are increas-
ing in  θ . In particular, let us take  θ as the quantiles of the average cost distribution, 
so that
  Γ(θ ) =  ∫ θ 1  ∑ s=1
S
  π s ( θ ′ )  l s ( θ ′ ) dF( θ ′ )/(1 − F(θ )) 
is the average cost of the most costly  1 − θ share of the population, and  F(θ ) = θ . 
Clearly,  Γ(θ) is still increasing in  θ as before.
Correspondingly, we can capture the consumers’ willingness to pay for insur-
ance for those individuals who are located at the  θ -quantile of the cost distribution. 
Formally, for each quantile  θ , let  Ω(θ) be given by the highest value of  Ω such that
  u(w(θ) − Ω; θ ) =  ∑ 
s=1
S
  π s (θ) u(w(θ) −  l s (θ); θ). 
Note that we can allow for both wealth levels  w(θ) and preferences (notably risk 
aversion)  u(c; θ) to vary across quantiles of the cost distribution; for instance, higher 
expected cost individuals may on average be wealthier (since older) or more risk-
averse (they see the doctor more often).
As long as  Ω(θ) remains increasing—and, hence, higher expected cost individu-
als on average have a higher willingness to pay for insurance—our entire analysis 
from before is maintained: a competitive equilibrium corresponds to a quantile  θ 
where  Γ(θ) = Ω(θ) . We can also employ the same graphical approach as before, 
the only difference being that the  π -axis turns into an  θ -axis of quantiles of the cost 
distribution. At an equilibrium with critical quantile  θ ∗ , the share of the population 
purchasing insurance is given by  1 −  θ ∗ , and so  1 − θ can also be interpreted as 
quantity of insurance as in Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010).
Figure 20 shows a calibration based on the Medical Expenditure Survey Panel 
and the Survey of Consumer finances where the probability of loss  π is fixed (at 
0.3) but the size of loss  l s (θ) is now allowed to vary across the types (with S = 1). 
As before, the horizontal axis corresponds to the top  X percent of spenders, where 
X (the “rank”) is the shown value. Now, however, the variation in spending comes 
from differences in loss amounts rather than probabilities. (Given the fixed value 
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of  π , a recursive algorithm parallel to that discussed in the text is used to impute 
the losses across the different values of  X .) As before, the relatively small value of 
α = 1 leads to unraveling. However, both the in-between and large values of  α lead 
to multiple stable equilibria: one at the left-most intersection of willingness to pay 
and average cost lines and a second at the corner case where  X = 5 , where the will-
ingness to pay is below the average cost. The driving force is, again, limited liability. 
As  X gets small, the value of losses must grow in order to match spending levels in 
the MEPS. As a result, the willingness to pay is capped for a wider range of types 
at smaller values of  X corresponding to larger losses. Increasing the level of risk 
aversion, therefore, has very little impact on the demand for insurance in this range.
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